CADC 2010





October 14-15, 2010 | Mont-Tremblant, Québec


Statistical Backdrop of Managed Futures
By: Ranjan Bhaduri, PhD CFA CAIA



Liquidity

- "Liquidity is the first line of Defense."
- Daniel MacDonald, CFA, Portfolio Manager, Alternative Investments Ontario Teachers Pension Plan








Managed Futures Risk Management

3 -Year Rolling Returns: Various Traditional and Alternative Indices, January 1990 – August 2010





| | Barclay CTA |
|------------------|-------------|
| | Index |
| Maximum | 79.43% |
| Average | 22.89% |
| Minimum | 1.50% |
| Negative Returns | 0 |

■ S&P 500 ■ Barclay CTA Index

Source: AlphaMetrix Alternative Investment Advisors, CME Group, Bloomberg Past results are not necessarily indicative of future results.

FUTURES TRADING IS SPECULATIVE, AND INVESTORS CAN LOSE ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THEIR INVESTMENT. MEASURES THAT PROFILE RISK AND REWARD SUCH AS STANDARD DEVIATION, MAX DRAW DOWN AND THE SHARPE RATIO MAY MATERIALLY UNDERSTATE TRUE RISK BECAUSE FUTURES TRADING IS SUBJECT TO A "RISK OF RUIN" WHICH IS NOT REFLECTED IN SUCH STATISTICS. COMPARISONS OF ACTIVELY MANAGED PRODUCTS TO PASSIVE FINANCIAL INDICES INVOLVE MATERIAL INHERENT LIMITATIONS.



Managed Futures Risk Management

3 -Year Rolling Returns: Various Traditional and Alternative Indices, January 1993 – August 2010


| | S&P 500 Index | Barclays Bond Composite Global Index | S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Total Return Index | HFR Equity Hedge Index | HFRI Fund Weighted Index | Barclay CTA Index | Barclay BTOP50 Index |
|--|------------------|--|--|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| Number of 3 Year Rolling Negative Periods (out of n = 212) | 59 | 0 | 68 | 19 | 5 | 0 | 0 |


^{*}Barclays Bond Composite Global Index did not report returns for Sep 2008 and Oct 2008 Source: AlphaMetrix Alternative Investment Advisors, CME Group, Bloomberg

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Managed Futures Risk Management






- CTAs generally employ active risk management which typically includes disciplined adherence to well-defined stop-loss limits
- Managed futures programs also have the ability to go long, short, or neutral which also may help CTAs to recover more quickly from drawdowns by generating returns in falling markets
- Indices of managed products are not indicative of the performance of any individual account.

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The Case for Diversification: Omega Functions

Omega Graph: BTOP 50 Index and Traditional Portfolio of Equities and Fixed Income, January 1987 – August 2010



Source: AlphaMetrix, Bloomberg

Annualized Return Threshold (%)
Past results are not necessarily indicative of future results

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The Case for Diversification: Correlations

Managed futures have potential to show low correlation to broader market indices (Jan 1990 – Aug 2010)

| | S&P 500 Index | Barclays Capital Bond Composite Global Index | S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Total Return Index | HFR Equity Hedge Index | HFRI Fund Weighted Index | Barclay BTOP50 Index | Barclay CTA Index |
|--|------------------|--|--|---------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| S&P 500 Index | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| Barclays Capital Bond Composite Global Index | 0.15 | 1.00 | | | | | |
| S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Total Return Index | 0.12 | 0.05 | 1.00 | | | | |
| HFRI Fund Weighted Index | 0.72 | 0.07 | 0.32 | 1.00 | | | |
| HFR Equity Hedge Index | 0.73 | 0.06 | 0.27 | 0.95 | 1.00 | | |
| Barclay BTOP50 Index | -0.12 | 0.26 | 0.14 | -0.04 | -0.04 | 1.00 | |
| Barclay CTA Index | -0.12 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.92 | 1.00 |

^{*}Barclays Bond Composite Global Index did not report returns for Sep 2008 and Oct 2008
Source: AlphaMetrix Alternative Investment Advisors, Bloomberg. Indices of managed products are not indicative of the performance of any individual account. Past results are not necessarily indicative of future results.

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Managed Futures – Performance During Equity Market Drawdowns

| Performance of the Barclay CTA Index during 15 Worst Quarters of S&P 500 Index Performance | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|------------------|-----------------------------|------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Period | Event | S&P 500 Index | Barclay BTOP 50 Index | Difference | | | | | | |
| Fourth Quarter 1987 | Black Monday - Global Stock Markets Crash | -23.23% | 16.88% | 40.11% | | | | | | |
| Fourth Quarter 2008 | Bear Market in U.S. Equities led by Financials | -22.56% | 8.73% | 31.29% | | | | | | |
| Third Quarter 2002 | WorldCom Scandal | -17.63% | 9.41% | 27.05% | | | | | | |
| Third Quarter 2001 | Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon | -14.99% | 4.12% | 19.10% | | | | | | |
| Third Quarter 1990 | Iraq Invades Kuwait | -14.52% | 11.22% | 25.74% | | | | | | |
| Second Quarter 2002 | Continuing Aftermath of Technology Bubble Bursting | -13.73% | 8.52% | 22.26% | | | | | | |
| First Quarter 2001 | Bear Market in U.S. Equities led by Technology | -12.11% | 5.97% | 18.08% | | | | | | |
| Second Quarter 2010 | European Sovereign Debt Crisis, "Flash Crash" in U.S. Equities | -11.86% | -1.92% | 9.94% | | | | | | |
| Third Quarter 1998 | Russia Defaults on Debt, LTCM Crisis | -10.30% | 10.54% | 20.84% | | | | | | |
| First Quarter 2008 | Credit Crisis, Commodity Prices Rally | -9.92% | 5.91% | 15.83% | | | | | | |
| Third Quarter 2008 | Credit Crisis, Government-Sponsored Bailout of Banks | -8.88% | -3.71% | 5.17% | | | | | | |
| Fourth Quarter 2000 | DotCom Bubble Bursts | -8.09% | 19.78% | 27.87% | | | | | | |
| Third Quarter 1999 | Anxiety during Run Up to Y2K | -6.56% | -0.67% | 5.89% | | | | | | |
| First Quarter 1994 | Federal Reserve Begins Increasing Interest Rates | -4.43% | -2.10% | 2.33% | | | | | | |
| Fourth Quarter 2007 | Credit Crisis, Subprime Mortgage Losses | -3.82% | 3.02% | 6.84% | | | | | | |
| Source: Alpha Metrix Alternative In | vestment Advisors, Bloomberg | | | | | | | | | |


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⁻ Indices of managed products are not indicative of the performance of any individual account. Past results are not necessarily indicative of future results.



Managed Futures – Performance During Equity Market Drawdowns

Performance of the Barclay CTA Index during the Worst 5 S&P 500 Drawdowns since 1990



- While not a hedge, managed futures has historically tended to perform well during periods that have been difficult for equities and many other hedge fund strategies.
- This effect may possibly enhance the benefits from diversification managed futures offer by potentially contributing to an investor's portfolio during periods that may be difficult for other investments

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Presentation based on some Recent Research

Abrams, Ryan and Ranjan Bhaduri and Elizabeth Flores. "Lintner Revisited: The Benefits of Managed Futures 25 Years Later" CME Group, 2009.

Bhaduri, R. "Liquidity Alpha" http://allaboutalpha.com/blog/2007/11/27/alternative-viewpoints-liquidity-alpha/ (November 27, 2007).

Bhaduri, R.. "The Truth about Hedge Funds." Benefits & Pensions Monitor, (May 2007).

Bhaduri, R. and Art, C. "Liquidity Buckets, Liquidity Performance Indices, Liquidity Duration, and their Application to Hedge Funds." Alternative Investment Quarterly, July 2008.

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Bhaduri, R. and G. Meissner. "Modeling non-normal CDO returns with the Omega Function", chapter 7 of The Definitive Guide to CDOs - Market, Application, Valuation, and Hedging. RISK Books. (July 2008).

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Whelan, N. and Bhaduri, R. "The Value of Liquidity and Option Timing from a Simple Game." Alternative Intelligence Quotient, (October 2009).

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Appendix

Index Definitions:

S&P 500 Index - Standard and Poor's 500 Index is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks. The index is designed to measure performance of the broad domestic economy through changes in the aggregate market value of 500 stocks representing all major industries.

The Barclays Bond Composite Global Index, the successor to the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index, which includes U.S. government, corporate and mortgage-backed securities with maturities up to 30 years.

S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index TR - The S&P GSCI is calculated primarily on a world production weighted basis, and is comprised of the principal physical commodities that are the subject of active, liquid futures markets. The weight of each commodity in the index is determined by the average quantity of production as per the last five years of available data. The production weights are designed to reflect the relative significance of each of the constituent commodities in the world economy while preserving the tradability of the index.

The Barclay BTOP50 Index seeks to replicate the overall composition of the managed futures industry with regard to trading style and overall market exposure. The largest investable trading advisor programs, as measured by assets under management (determined as of the beginning of each year), are selected for inclusion in the BTOP50.

The Barclay CTA Index is unweighted and rebalanced at the beginning of each year. For 2010, it is currently comprised of 533 programs.

The HFRI Fund Weighted Index is an equally-weighted index of more than 2000 hedge funds which have at least \$50 million in assets under management or have been actively trading for at least 12 months.

The HFRI Equity Hedge Total Return Index is an equally-weighted index of equity hedge strategies which trade both long and short in primarily equity and derivative securities. A wide variety of investment processes can be employed to arrive at an investment decision, including both quantitative and fundamental techniques; strategies can be broadly diversified or narrowly focused on specific sectors and can range broadly in terms of levels of net exposure, leverage employed, holding period, concentrations of market capitalizations and valuation ranges of typical portfolios. Equity Hedge managers would typically maintain at least 50 percent exposure to equities, both long and short.



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The Fund is speculative and involves a substantial risk of loss.

The Fund's performance may be volatile.

Redemptions may be made only infrequently and only if an investor provides prior written notice of its desire to redeem well in advance of the intended redemption date.

The Fund is highly illiquid.

There is no secondary market for the units in the Fund and none is expected to develop.

There are restrictions on transferring units in the Fund.

The Fund' fees and expenses are significant. Trading profits must be greater than such fees and expenses to avoid loss of capital.

The Fund is not required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors with respect to their individual investments.

There may involve complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information.

The Fund is not subject to the same regulatory requirements as U.S. mutual funds.

Trades executed for the Fund will take place on non-U.S. and U.S markets.

The Fund may be subject to conflicts of interest.

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CADC 2010October 14, 2010

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Managed Futures

"Changing landscapes in managed futures are offering new directions for portfolio diversification."

---Thomas Lott, President, Potomac Portfolios LLC

- Industry Performance
- Market Segmentation
- Portfolio Construction
- The Buy Decision
 - Economic Justification
 - Value Proposition
 - Safeguards for Investors
 - People!

Industry Performance (Monthly: Jan 1998 - Aug 2010)

Stocks (SP500)

Managed Futures (Barclay CTA Index)



Industry Performance (Monthly: Jan 1998 - Aug 2010)

Stocks (SP500)

Managed Futures (Barclay CTA Index)


Hedge Funds (HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index)



Periods of Systemic Stress


Managed Futures vs. SP500

Lintner Revisited: The Benefits of Managed Futures 25 Years Later




Frontier of Hedge Fund Efficiency

Ulcer Index




Funds Under Management - CTA

Managed Futures (\$ billions)




Funds Under Management – Hedge Funds Hedge Funds (\$ billions)



Market Segmentation: CTA Pre-2000

Alpha vs. Beta Trading Strategies


Alpha (25%) vs. Beta (75%) \$50 - \$100 Billion



Market Segmentation: 2010


Alpha vs. Beta Trading Strategies





Market Segmentation: 2015-2020

Alpha vs. Beta vs. Emerging Strategies



Portfolio Construction - Beta vs. Alpha

Beta: Trend Following Strategies

Beta Selection

- 1 Abraham Trading Company
- 2 Aspect Capital LTD
- 3 Chesapeake Capital Corporation
- 4 Eclipse Capital Management
- 5 Graham Capital Management, L.P.
- 6 Millburn Ridgefield Corporation
- 7 Rotella Capital Management, Inc.
- 8 Transtrend, B.V.
- 9 Welton Investment Corporation
- 10 Winton Capital Management, LTD

Beta correlations are high (Jan 2005 – Aug 2010)

Correlation Matrix (pair wise = 62%)

| % | BETA 1 | BETA 2 | ВЕТА 3 | BETA 4 | BETA 5 | BETA 6 | BETA 7 | BETA 8 | BETA 9 | BETA 10 |
|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| BETA 1 | 100 | 57 | 48 | 55 | 51 | 55 | 36 | 47 | 49 | 62 |
| BETA 2 | 57 | 100 | 75 | 76 | 74 | 87 | 63 | 76 | 70 | 77 |
| BETA 3 | 48 | 75 | 100 | 53 | 55 | 81 | 68 | 61 | 67 | 59 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| BETA 4 | 55 | 76 | 53 | 100 | 72 | 70 | 50 | 69 | 59 | 56 |
| BETA 5 | 51 | 74 | 55 | 72 | 100 | 76 | 53 | 74 | 66 | 58 |
| BETA 6 | 55 | 87 | 81 | 70 | 76 | 100 | 59 | 74 | 69 | 63 |
| BETA 7 | 36 | 63 | 68 | 50 | 53 | 59 | 100 | 55 | 64 | 61 |
| BETA 8 | 47 | 76 | 61 | 69 | 74 | 55 | 55 | 100 | 73 | 67 |
| BETA 9 | 49 | 70 | 67 | 59 | 66 | 64 | 64 | 73 | 100 | 69 |
| BETA 10 | 62 | 77 | 59 | 56 | 58 | 61 | 61 | 67 | 69 | 100 |
| AVG | 40 | 73 | 63 | 62 | 64 | 68 | 57 | 66 | 65 | 64 |

Beta portfolios can be volatile (Jan 2005 - Aug 2010)

Aggregating trend following strategies



Alpha correlations are low (Jan 2005 - Aug 2010)

Correlation Matrix (pair wise = 8%)

| % | ALPHA 1 | ALPHA 2 | ALPHA 3 | ALPHA 4 | ALPHA 5 | ALPHA 6 | ALPHA 7 | ALPHA 8 | ALPHA 9 | ALPHA 10 |
|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| ALPHA 1 | 100 | 20 | 3 | -14 | 22 | 14 | 32 | 11 | -9 | -20 |
| ALPHA 2 | 20 | 100 | 17 | -4 | 31 | 59 | 19 | 32 | 7 | -15 |
| ALPHA 3 | 3 | 17 | 100 | 5 | 8 | -1 | -14 | 33 | 9 | 22 |
| ALPHA 4 | -14 | -4 | 5 | 100 | 9 | 2 | 11 | 28 | -9 | -8 |
| ALPHA 5 | 22 | 31 | 8 | 9 | 100 | 23 | 22 | 33 | -18 | -5 |
| ALPHA 6 | 14 | 59 | -1 | 2 | 23 | 100 | 23 | 23 | -3 | 25 |
| ALPHA 7 | 32 | 19 | -14 | 11 | 22 | 23 | 100 | 28 | -23 | 3 |
| ALPHA 8 | 11 | 32 | 33 | 28 | 33 | 23 | 28 | 100 | -29 | 11 |
| ALPHA 9 | -9 | 7 | 9 | -9 | -18 | -3 | -23 | -29 | 100 | 24 |
| ALPHA 10 | -10 | -15 | 22 | -8 | -5 | 25 | 3 | 11 | 24 | 100 |
| AVG | 6 | 15 | 7 | 2 | 11 | 15 | 9 | 15 | -5 | 3 |

Alpha portfolios can be less volatile (Jan 2005 - Aug 2010)

Aggregating Alpha Strategies



Alpha portfolios can be less volatile (Jan 2005 - Aug 2010)

Aggregating Alpha Strategies (pair wise = 32%)




Portfolio Construction - Analytics


Monthly Distribution of Portfolio Returns

Without Cash Efficiency Jan 2005 - Aug 2010

Beta: Trend Following




Alpha: Potomac's Approach



Implications for Portfolio Construction

Alpha vs. Beta vs. Benchmarks (Jan 2005 - Aug 2010)




Portfolio Construction - Analytics


Monthly Distribution of Portfolio Returns

Adding Cash Efficiency Jan 2005 - Aug 2010

Beta: Trend Following




Alpha: Potomac's Approach




Implications for Portfolio Construction

Alpha vs. Beta vs. Benchmarks (Jan 2005 - Aug 2010)




Implications for Portfolio Construction

Alpha vs. Beta vs. Benchmarks (Jan 2005 - Aug 2010)




Portfolio Construction - Analytics


<u>Omega Curves</u>: Alpha Portfolios = Higher Probability of Achieving Threshold Returns <u>Cash Efficiency</u>: Alpha Portfolios = More Receptive to Concepts of Cash Efficiency



I. Across Strategies



II. Across Sectors



III. Across Instruments (160)

- Agriculture (16)
 - Meats (3)
 - Softs (6)
 - Grains (7)
- Currencies (44)
 - Major Markets (27)
 - Emerging Markets (17)
- Energy (7)
 - Power (2)
 - Natural Gas (1)
 - Petroleum (4)

Stock & Other Indices (43)

European Union (22)

Asia Pacific (9)


North America (8)

Africa (1)


Emerging, Commodity (3)

- Interest Rates (40)
 - European Union (22)
 - North America (11)
 - Asia Pacific (7)
- Metals (10)
 - Industrial (6)
 - Precious (4)

IV. Across Trade Duration



V. Manager Mentalities




--- Albert Einstein, 1879-1955

Alpha Diversification: Example

Garrison Hill Multi-Strategy vs. 2100 Xenon Fixed Income

Both Managers > SP500; at 1/3rd of SP500 Volatility

50/50 Allocation: -0.23% Correlation with SP500; 0.07% Correlation with Each Other





Bottom Line

Team Effort: It's the people that make the difference Mosaic: Potomac + Managers + AlphaMetrix



For Further Information

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Manager Reporting: Research@PotomacPortfolios.com



Fixed Income Trading Opportunities in a Zero Interest Rate Environment


October 2010

Presentation by:

Jay Feuerstein Chief Executive Officer/Chief Investment Officer 2100 Xenon Group, LLC

Overview







The Current Landscape: Historic Levels of Low Rates

Central banks across the globe have universally pushed rates to their lowest levels in history

Central Bank Policy Rates: 1980 to Present




Source: Bloomberg. Data as of 8/10



Scenario 1: Interest Rates Remain Static

Today we are in a historically steep yield curve, with carry yielding over 3.7% per annum

Carry Benefit From Holding Futures



Source: Bloomberg. Data as of 8/10

Developed market financial futures are margined at less than 5% of equity, providing huge gains over cash in a flat rate environment through convergence

March 2011 Long Bond

| Futures Contract Value | Initial Margin Per Contract | | Annualized Return on Margin | Annualized Return on 20% Margin |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 129,468.75 | 3,375 | 4,116 | 190.9% | 24.9% |



| Futures | Cash Price | Gross | | | | |
|-----------|------------------|--------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| Price | | Factor | Factor | Basis | | |
| 129 15/32 | 143 1/32 | 1.0741 | 139 2/32 | 3 31/32 | | |
| Today | Delivery Date | Coupon of Cheapest | Repo Rate | Coupon Income | Financing Costs | Total Carry \$100 par |
| 8/13/2010 | 3/31/2011 | 6.75% | 0.15% | 4.25 | 0.14 | \$4.12 |

The payment for this uncertainty has added nearly 70 basis points per annum over carry since 1998 in the US

3 month Long 10Y Futures Strategy

| | 3 Months to Expiration | | | At Expiration | | | Outperformance of Long Futures in excess of Carry | |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---|-----------------|
| Contract | Basis to the Cheapest | Carry on the Cheapst | Basis Net of Carry 3m | Basis | Carry on the | Basis Net of Carry at | 32nds | ann return (bp) |
| | to Deliver | to Deliver | to Expiration | | Cheapest to Deliver | Expiration | | |
| Jun-98 | | 11.2 | 2.1 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0 | | 24.8 |
| Sep-98 | | 4.1 | 6.9 | | 0.2 | -0.9 | 7.8 | 94.7 |
| Dec-98 | | 3.8 | 3.2 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 21.7 |
| Mar-99 | 6.2 | 6.3 | -0.1 | 2.2 | 0.7 | 1.5 | -1.6 | -19.6 |
| Jun-99 | | 13 | 5.3 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 4.3 | 51.1 |
| Sep-99 | 17.1 | 12.9 | 4.2 | 0.4 | 1.1 | -0.7 | 4.9 | 59.3 |
| Dec-99 | 14.1 | 13 | _ 1 | 0.4 | 0.9 | -0.6 | | 19.2 |
| Mar-00 | | 0.6 | 7.4 | -0.2 | -0.2 | 0 | | 104 |
| Jun-00 | 5.3 | -4 | 9.3 | 3 | -0.8 | 3.8 | 5.5 | 77.7 |
| Sep-00 | | -9 | 11 | -0.5 | -0.9 | 0.4 | 10.6 | 149.8 |
| Dec-00 | | -7 | 9 | | -0.9 | 8.7 | 0.3 | 3.7 |
| Mar-01 | -2.5 | -6.6 | 4.1 | -0.3 | 0.4 | -0.7 | 4.8 | 57.9 |
| Jun-01 | 10.8 | 6.9 | 3.8 | 8.5 | 1.5 | 7 | -3.2 | -38.9 |
| Sep-01 | 32.3 | 20.4 | 11.9 | 5.3 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 8.5 | 100.8 |
| Dec-01 | 46.9 | 36.8 | 10.1 | 4.7 | 5 | -0.3 | 10.4 | 118 |
| Mar-02 | 53.1 | 40.4 35.7 | 12.7 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 0.3 | 12.3 | 142.8 |
| Jun-02 | 47.4 | 35.7 41.4 | 11.7 | 5.9 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 9 | 110.9 |
| Sep-02 | 51 40 | | 9.7 | 8.9 | 4.4 4.9 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 57.5 |
| Dec-02 | | 36.5 | 3.5 | 7 | 4.9 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 16 52.9 |
| Mar-03 Jun-03 | 49.6 50.1 | 44.9 44.8 | 4.7 5.3 | 4.6 4.2 | 5.1 | -0.3 -0.8 | 5 6.1 | 66.6 |
| Sep-03 | 44.7 | 42.4 | 2.2 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 00.0 |
| Dec-03 | 56.2 | 42.4 | 13.4 | 5.1 | 4.9 5.6 | -0.5 | 13.9 | 23 161.2 |
| Mar-04 | 43.1 | 36.7 | 6.4 | 3.1 | 3.2 | -0.3 | 6.6 | 78.1 |
| Jun-04 | 39.2 | 35.5 | 3.7 | 4.8 | | 1.6 | 2.1 | 24.5 |
| Sep-04 | 40 | 31.8 | 8.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | -0.1 | 8.4 | 100.5 |
| Dec-04 | 27.9 | 27.4 | 0.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 100.5 |
| Mar-05 | 23.6 | 23 | 0.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | -0.1 | 0.6 | 4.4 7.5 |
| Jun-05 | | 20.2 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 3 | -0.6 | 1.9 | 23.8 |
| Sep-05 | 15.9 | 15.5 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.4 |
| Dec-05 | | 6.3 | 0.8 | | 0.4 | 1 | -0.2 | 0.4 -2.4 |
| Mar-06 | | 3 | 1 | 0.1 | -0.2 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 9.6 |
| Jun-06 | | -3.2 | 0.1 | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.3 | -0.2 | -2.1 |
| Sep-06 | | -8.5 | 4.2 | 0 | | 0.9 | 3.3 | 46.1 |
| Dec-06 | | -5.8 | 2.5 | | -0.8 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 18.7 |
| Mar-07 | -4.3 | -6 | 1.7 | -0.5 | -0.6 | 0.1 | 1.6 | 20.8 |
| Jun-07 | -5.8 | -7.9 | 2.1 | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.1 | 2.2 | 29.5 |
| Sep-07 | 5.9 | -0.1 | 6 | | 0.2 | 0.3 | 5.8 | 74.9 |
| Dec-07 | 6.2 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 3.5 | 45 |
| Mar-08 | | 7.8 | 4.8 | 10.6 | 3.1 | 7.5 | -2.7 | -33.1 |
| Jun-08 | 56.4 | 31.8 | 24.6 | 5.3 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 22.2 | 240.5 |
| Sep-08 | | 25.5 | 10.4 | 2.8 | | -0.5 | 10.9 | 127.4 |
| Dec-08 | | 28.6 | 7.5 | 4.9 | 5.3 | -0.4 | 7.9 | 92.1 |
| Mar-09 | 83.2 | 36 | 47.2 | 6.9 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 43.4 | 542.5 |
| Jun-09 | | 43.2 | 0.5 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 5 |
| Sep-09 | | 42.6 | 5.2 | -7.8 | 3.5 | -11.3 | 16.5 | 206.25 |
| Dec-09 | | 41.5 | 5.5 | | 3.8 | -3.4 | 8.9 | 111.25 |
| Mar-10 | | 22.9 | 4.6 | | 1.8 | 0.7 | 3.9 | 48.75 |
| Jun-10 | 40.6 | 37.9 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.2 | -0.3 | 3 | 37.5 |
| Average Annualized outperformance over long 10 year cash in bps 67.60 | | | | | | | | |

Note: this assumes that you buy 10 year futures 3m to expiry and roll them at first notice


Through convergence, a typical futures investor could make upwards of 25% on their cash

March 2011 Long Bond


| Futures Contract Value | | Possible Net of Carry Convergence | Carry Per Contract | Annualized Return on Margin | Annualized Return on 20% Margin |
|---------------------------|-------|---|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 129,468.75 | 3,375 | 875 | 4,116 | 190.9% | 24.9% |

This is not just a US phenomenon. In Japan, rolling long futures positions outperformed cash while short rates remained flat

Government 10Y Yields: 1989 to Present



Hypothetical or simulated performance results have certain inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record, simulated results do not represent actual trading. PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT INDICITAVE OF FUTURE RESULTS



Scenario 2: Interest Rates Fall


If rates fall, fixed income futures strategies will outperform cash investments based on basis convergence, current longs, and leverage

- > The long futures position will be paid the carry as well as the delivery option price
- Carry is equivalent to a long cash investment due to negative implied repo rates, but without the need for cash (10 year futures run at 4% margin to equity)
- Currently, most momentum strategies have a long bias, thus poised to capitalize from this scenario

If rates fall, gains are realized on the capital appreciation as well as the convergence made in the flat scenario

March 2011 Long Bond

| Futures Contract Value | | Possible Net of Carry Convergence | Carry Per Contract | Annualized Return on Margin | Annualized Return on 20% Margin |
|---------------------------|-------|---|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 129,468.75 | 3,375 | 875 | 4,116 | 190.9% | 24.9% |




Scenario 3: Interest Rates Rise

Futures are negatively convex instruments so as rates rise they fall faster, outperforming the cash


Futures Price Profile Given Deliverable Basket

US 30Y Future Pricing Profile



Today the deliverable bond has the lowest possible duration. This creates the greatest number of possible bond switches as rates rise

Futures Price Profile Given Deliverable Basket



^{*} Basis = Price - Factor x Futures

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OSJ-3 2/09

Garrison Hill Capital Management Inc.



Garrison Hill Multi-Strategy LP I (Fundamental Global Macro)

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL



Introduction to Garrison Hill Capital Management Inc.

- Garrison Hill Capital Management Inc. (Garrison Hill) is a 'macro' focused wealth management firm located in Toronto, Canada.
- Garrison Hill helps clients understand the <u>global events</u> that will impact their ability to preserve and grow wealth for future generations.
- Garrison Hill was founded in 2006, prior to the start of the financial crisis, and has provided its clients with positive returns, capital preservation, and low volatility through its flagship Fund, as well as its discretionary managed accounts.

Fund Overview - Risk and Return Goals & Comparative Performance

- The Fund has an absolute return target of 10-15% annually, irrespective of market conditions.
- The Fund targets a volatility of approximately one-half the major equities indicies (~10%)
- Since inception the Fund has provided positive returns, with low volatility and virtually no correlation to the major equity indicies

| | Total Return | Volatility |
|--------------------------------|--------------|------------|
| Garrison Hill | +14% | 6% |
| S&P/TSX | -9% | 19% |
| S&P 500 | -25% | 20% |
| Scotia Cdn Hedge Fund Index | +1% | 11% |

Note: All data is approximated as at August 31, 2010. Inception of Fund as at March 2007.

Fund Overview – Investment Strategies

- The Fund is actively managed and uses <u>long</u> and <u>short</u> strategies in a broad range of asset classes such as currencies, commodities, fixed income, and equities in order to achieve its investment objective.
- The Fund may utilize a variety of instruments to achieve the exposure including exchange traded products such as equity and futures or overthe-counter derivative products such as foreign exchange forwards or credit default swaps.
- The Fund will generally be carrying several investment themes/positions across various asset classes and instruments.
- The goal of the Fund is ultimately to create investable ideas from the rapidly changing 'macro' events.

Fund Overview – AUD/CAD Currency Example

- In April/May, we believed that the Canadian dollar would outperform the Australian dollar in anticipation of the Bank of Canada stepping up the pace of interest rate hikes relative to the Reserve Bank of Australia
- RBA was further ahead in the rate hiking cycle than BOC (RBA had raised rates 1.75% while BOC was still at 0.25%)
- Narrowing of short term interest rate differentials should see the Canadian dollar outperform the Australian dollar.
- Analysis of Canadian economic data, Bank of Canada language suggested further rate hikes. Our prediction earlier in the year was that the BoC would raise rates 1.00%-1.25%

Fund Overview -AUD/CAD Currency Example



Fund Overview – AUD/CAD Currency Example

- Fund achieved a 5.5% gain on the position on a notional position representing 20% of the Funds assets for a total Fund gain of +1.1%
- Trade developed <u>very quickly</u> and has since reversed due to sluggishness in US data which affects Canada directly and continued strength in Australian economy due to strong Chinese growth.
- There will be opportunity to enter the trade from <u>either side</u> depending on our judgment of market conditions, economic conditions and probably policy action.
- Alternative we can choose to 'do nothing'
- We used currency futures to create this position but we could have used the spot market, forward markets (OTC derivatives) or options (OTC)

Fund Overview – Bullish Gold Examples

- In 2009 we <u>reversed</u> our prior bearish position on Gold due to favorable supply/demand dynamics, our view of increasing monetary intervention and uncertain investing environment
- We predicted \$1300 gold would be achieved in short order and chose to express this position two general ways.
- Direct gold equity investments and investment in the Gold futures
- Our reasons for buying gold equities was that they were 'cheap' if one assumed a gold price of greater than \$1000 for several years and the stocks had numerous catalysts which would still cause the prices to move higher (i.e. takeover, financing, reserve additions) even without gold rallying.

Fund Overview – Equity Options Structure on Osisko Mining Corporation

- We were convicted on the fundamentals of Osisko Mining Corporation (OSK: TSX). OSK has a \$5 billion market cap. 1-2 million shares average daily volume.
- At the time the stock was trading at \$8 and we entered into the following transaction
 - Sold 3000 October 7.00 PUTS
 - Bought 1500 October 10.00 CALLS
 - > Sold 1500 October 11.00 CALLS
- This is a bullish strategy with capped upside, financed by the sale of puts so that it had 'positive carry'

Fund Overview – Equity Options Structure on Osisko Mining Corporation



Fund Overview – Equity Options Structure on Osisko Mining Corporation

- Made +200K (max profit) on the transaction.
- Trades were done in the 'upstairs market' meaning that Garrison Hill executed with a Broker that used their own capital and then put the trade up through the MX.
- Much of the Canadian market for larger sized trades requires a Broker to commit capital, unlike the US where there is deeper liquidity.

Summary – Global Macro

- "Alpha" is generated by the careful analysis and consideration of changing economic, political and market conditions.
- We will try to anticipate changes in the value of many markets and can use long/short or relative value strategies to capture the profit.
- Fundamental global macro investors are on the forefront of economic thinking as it is a requirement to produce returns.

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