

# **ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL**

# **PERSPECTIVES**

## CANADIAN ANNUAL DERIVATIVES CONFERENCE

14. OCTOBER 2010

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
## **Overview**


- Review of Financial Crisis and its main factors
- Role and Development of Derivative Markets
- Economic and Financial Outlook 2011

## What Lessons?



"Simply stated, the bright new financial system – for all its talented participants, for all its rich rewards – has failed the test of the market place." Paul Volcker, April 8 2008





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### 10. Roots of current crisis

Has the current crisis been caused by banks' reckless mortgage lending?

- US non-banks have been the epicenter
- IB leverage (30x-60x) has been incubator
- Fannie and Freddie have been catalysts
- Most credit spreads were at historic lows

Trend to leaner private universal banks

## 9. Failure on risk governance

- Are financial crises <u>inevitably linked</u> to innovative financial systems?
- Leading innovators have been least affected
- Independent risk management has paid off: CRO = co-pilot ≠ engineer ≠ FAA
- Risk must be owned at the top of the house: Heads we win ≠ Tails you loose
- Shareholders need focus on risk governance

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## 8. Regulation: risk-based capital

Does pro-cyclical effect of Basel-2 exacerbate the current crisis?

- Risk-based capital for banks <u>and</u> non-banks
- Pricing longer-term through-the-cycle needed
- Transformation risk has been underestimated
- Regulators have neglected liquidity risk

Short-term funding must not be subsidized

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## 7. Governance and scapegoats

Was the crisis triggered by <u>executive pay</u>, <u>ratings failures</u>, and <u>underwriting fraud</u>?

- Valuations have been the weakest link of chain
- Five sigma events usually don't show in ratings
- Light regulation facilitated underwriting neglect
- Governance is most problematic in GSEs
- Promote competition and oversight over ratings
- Penalize illiquid opaque hard-to-value securities

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### 6. Reliance on black-box models

Has reliance on <u>VAR models</u> led to herding and provided false comfort for management?

- Risk management is both art and science
- Innovators of VAR models had good judgement
- Scenario analysis and stress testing are critical
- Liquidity risk was based on flawed assumptions

Risk management must have roots in institution

## 5. Accounting gimmicks

- \* Has volatility been exacerbated by market-value accounting (MVA)?
- Market prices can overshoot fundamental prices
- Market value complements cash flow models
- "hold-to-maturity" can become forbearance
- Gaps remain between GAAP and IASB
- Standard setting bodies need clear methodology and emphasize timely recognition of losses

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### 4. Securitization as villain

Has securitization better <u>distributed risk</u> across investors in the financial system?

- Short-dated funding of CDOs is not viable
- Misuse for maturity transformation and leverage
- US banks still retain high real estate exposure
- Qualification of investors has been questionable

Don't overreact – valid benefits of securitization

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### 3. Derivatives and destruction

\* Have derivatives insulated the system and enhanced financial stability?

- Bear Stearns and AIG were too big to fail
- OTC credit derivatives created systemic risk
- Standardization and documentation critical
- Central clearing counterparty is best practice

Exchanges can reduce CP and systemic risk

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## 2. Liquidity versus Solvency

Is official liquidity support sufficient to contain the current financial crisis?

- Liquidity can help to avoid overshooting
- Are insolvent institutions being propped-up?
- Valuation of bad assets: "devil in the details"
- Resolution of bad assets must commence
- How is collateral valued for liquidity support ?

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
## 1. Regulatory arbitrage


Has "light regulation" of the shadow system enhanced competitiveness and innovation?

- Regulatory arbitrage has been most detrimental
- Weakness in insurance and investment banking
- Flaws in SIVs, off-balance, offshore structures
- Systemic risk outside the core system is opaque
- Trend to single regulator with global reach

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### Global derivative markets





### Rewards and risks of derivatives

- Market efficiency
- Risk sharing and transfer
- ✓ Low transaction costs
- Capital intermediation
- Liquidity enhancement
- Price discovery
- Cash market development
- Hedging tools
- Regulatory savings

- × More leverage
- **X** Less transparency
- × Dubious accounting
- **X** Regulatory arbitrage
- X Hidden systemic risk
- ★ Counter-party risk
- ★ Tail-risk future exposure
- × Weak capital requirements
- × Zero-sum transfer tools

## Building blocks for derivatives

### Product Design

- Economic rationale for hedging needs
- Liquid cash market, long and short positions
- Market determined prices, interest/FX rates
- System stability, no moral hazard risks

#### Regulation


- Lead regulator, capital rules, reporting standards
- Legal clarity: ISDA standards, enforceability
- Accounting rules, transparency, disclosure
- Level playing field, tax harmonized, integration

#### Infrastructure

- CCP, ISDA master, close-out netting
- Demut. exchanges, strong capital, margins
- SRO rules enforced with limits, monitoring
- Certified investors, code of conduct

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Schematic development of D markets cash liquidity+sound regulation+solid infrastructure



## Thoughts on derivative markets

- Derivatives can enhance financial intermediation and economic growth but require effective underlying cash markets and sound infrastructure
- Modern exchanges with leading risk systems (CCP, dynamic margins, buffer) can enhance transparency, safety, and competitiveness of a financial system
- 3. Prudential supervision is critical for FX and credit derivatives which could undermine fixed prices, pegged FX regimes, and credit policies.

## **CDP Economic and Financial Outlook**


		CDP – GROWTH FORECASTS					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013		
World	-0.7	4.3	4.0	4.1	4.2		
Emerging Markets	2.5	6.4	6.0	6.1	6.3		
G7	-3.5	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.6		
United States	-2.4	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.1		
Canada	-2.5	3.1	2.5	3.2	3.4		
Japan	-5.3	2.9	1.5	1.5	1.5		
Euro Area	-4.1	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.9		


Source: CDP Economic analysis and asset allocation strategies

## **Global Economy**

### Two-speed recovery

- Strong recovery in 2010 with 4% global growth, gap G7 versus EM
- Emerging markets: engines of the global economy: growth of over 6%
- Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, QE2 likely by end of 2010
- Unsustainable public debt, high household debt, deleveraging to continue
- Tight credit conditions despite low interest rates and high profits
- Price stability, deflationary pressures, declining real estate sector






## **Major Economies**

Jobless recovery and risk of contraction


- Canada is G7 champion for economic and employment growth
- U.S. lagging, unemployment rate nearly 10% vs. 8% in Canada
- Weak consumer demand, slowing investment, declining confidence
- OECD and PMI leading indicators point to risk of G7-contraction
- Risk of a new recession (probability higher in Europe?)
- Premature reduction in fiscal and monetary stimulus may increase the risk




## **United States**

Quantitative easing (QE2)

- Effects of fiscal stimulus fading: impact -1.5% of GDP in 2011
- Disinflation continuing with excess capacity: CPI around 1%
- FOMC opens the door to quantitative easing (QE2) in late 2010
- \$1 trillion QE could lead to -30 bp rate reduction and +0.5% growth for 2011
- · However largely anticipated, temporary impact, modest success, greater risk appetite
- Risk of delays in QE2 implementation (as the FOMC is divided) would create volatility







## **United States**

#### Real estate continues to stall

- Sales of existing homes and mortgage applications at their lowest since 1996
- Mortgage applications drop due to expiry of government incentives
- Home foreclosures = 5 million (2010) + 11 million (Negative Equity > 25%)
- Price decrease (?) and anticipated excess volumes
- Foregiveness of "negative equity" would translate into \$600 billion writedown
- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are under pressure (\$145 billion government support)







## **Europe & The Euro**

### Periphery tension and tight credit conditions

- Modest growth in 2011 with recession in periphery countries
- Support program for the Euro area very important (€ 750 billion)
- Institutional reforms to strengthen the Euro area (new stability pact)
- Further injections of capital into European banks (towards Basel-3)
- Strong euro and tight credit conditions do not support growth
- Unsustainable debt in Greece (CDS > 800 basis points)







## **Europe**

### Premature tightening could undermine growth

- Fiscal austerity measures will reduce growth in 2011
- Economic policy errors could lead to renewed recession
- Investment, productivity & structural reforms, weak Euro, lower savings may support growth
- IMF forecasts indicate fiscal deterioration until 2015 and problematic debt ratios
- Rating agencies may further downgrade periphery countries
- Undesirable resolution mechanisms: inflation or restructuring






## **Japan**

### Risk of deflation still present ... after 15 years

- The Japan experience: deflation is entrenched, the yen is not helping
- Surprise in the U.S.: Inflation below 1% despite QE
- Expectations of 10-year inflation below 2% for the U.S. and Canada
- Expectations of 1.5 % inflation for the Euro zone
- Faster monetary expansion in emerging markets, rising rates needed
- Impact of raw materials and stronger EM exchange rates on inflation
- Impact of financial asset valuations on inflation (vicious cycle)






## **Japan**


#### Ineffective intervention to depreciate the yen

- On September 16, Japanese authorities intervened on the foreign exchange market to depreciate yen
  - Unilateral intervention totalled 2 trillion yen (US\$24 billion)
- Immediate effects:
  - The surprise announcement caused the yen to depreciate by 3.3%, from 82.5 to 85.3
  - The Nikkei, composed of large export companies, rose by nearly 3% during the day
- Other interventions are expected since the current environment promotes an appreciation of the yen (such as quantitative easing in the U.S., risk aversion and deflation).
- The effectiveness of this intervention will be limited in the medium term, because:
  - the yen is a counter-cyclical currency
  - deflation leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate
  - rate spreads with the U.S. and Europe are declining
  - historical analysis of Japanese interventions confirms inability to change the yen's basic trend
  - however, intervention is not sterilized this time.



### **G7** Economies


### Very high sovereign and household debt



## **Canada and United States**

### Forecasts for interest rates and equities





S&P 500 - 3-Year Forecast Scenarios




#### Source: Bloomberg, Economic analysis and asset allocation strategies,

#### Canada - Expected 2-Year & 10-Year Bond Yields




### Correlation between Canadian bonds and equities (monthly yield of DEX and TSX performance




## **Emerging Markets**

### On the verge of overheating

- China: Growth likely to moderate to 8%, fast credit growth of 30%, real estate sector slowdown, administrative controls, wage increases
- India: Nearly 10% inflation and 15% industrial growth suggest more rate hikes
- Brazil: Elections could lead to fiscal slippage and infrastructure program,
  massive new Petrobas issuance, possible Real intervention, 10% bond returns
- Emerging Markets: Attractive real interest rates, 6.8% local currency yield (GEMX index) while interest rates may rise to contain inflation of around 5%.






## **Exchange rate**

### The future of emerging markets

- Global imbalances require further revaluation of emerging market currencies
- Fundamental models indicate undervaluation of several emerging countries
- Renminbi appreciation (3% in 2010) appears insufficient to avoid U.S. protectionism
- "Carry" strategies support Australia, Canada, Brazil and South Africa (+20%)
- Structural factors indicate a significant undervaluation of Asian currencies (-20%)




## **CDP Outlook 2011-2013**

#### Benchmark Scenario

		GDP (% GROWTH)					CONSENSUS*	
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2011	
World (\$PPP)	-0.7	4.3	4.0	4.1	4.2	3.7	3.1	
G7	-3.5	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.6			
BIC	7.2	8.7	7.6	7.7	8.0			
United States	-2.4	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.1	2.7	2.4	
Canada	-2.5	3.1	2.5	3.2	3.4	3.1	2.5	
Japan	-5.3	2.9	1.5	1.5	1.5	3.0	1.3	
Euro Area	-4.1	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.6	1.4	
Germany	-4.9	3.0	1.7	1.8	1.9	3.2	1.9	
United Kingdom	-4.9	1.4	1.9	2.3	2.6	1.5	2.1	
China	9.1	9.5	8.0	8.2	8.6	9.9	9.0	
India	7.7	8.1	8.2	8.0	7.9	8.3	8.3	
Brazil	-0.2	6.1	4.8	5.0	5.1			

Sources: Economic analysis and asset allocation strategies, IMF, Global Insight, Consensus Forecasts

		INFLATION (%)					CONSENSUS	
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2011	
World (\$PPP)	2.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.1	2.6	2,5	
G7	-0.1	1.2	0.7	1.5	1.7			
BIC	3.1	5.5	4.9	4.5	3.8			
United States	-0.3	1.5	0.9	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.4	
Canada	0.3	1.4	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.7	2.1	
Japan	-1.4	-1.0	-1.3	-0.4	0.0	-0.9	-0.3	
Euro Area	0.2	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.6	
Germany	0.3	0.8	1.1	1.4,	1.5	1.1	1.4	
United Kingdom	2.2	3.0	1.8	1.9	2.5	3.1	2.6	
China	-0.7	3.0	4.2	3.8	3.2	3.0	3.1	
India	10.9	11.3	6.7	6.0	5.0	9.5	6.8	
Brazil	4.9	5.2	4.6	4.3	4.0			



Sources: Economic analysis and asset allocation strategies, IMF, Global Insight, Consensus Forecasts

### **THANK YOU**



## MANAGING RISK

